Among the many foreign policy decisions Donald Trump will have to make in his new administration will be what to do about Taiwan and the looming threat from China.
The U.S. government maintains a doctrine of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan to keep China second-guessing about how Washington might respond to an attack on the island. It technically has a “One-China Policy” that has, since 1979, formally recognizes the regime in Beijing and not the one in Taipei. At the same time, the U.S. reserves the right to engage with Taiwanese officials and support the island’s military until its final status has been conclusively resolved.
These long-time norms are increasingly being challenged as China has stepped up its belligerence toward the island, located just roughly 100 miles across the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing has staged progressively larger and more threatening military exercises around Taiwan. These large force drills are increasingly showcasing Beijing’s ability to blockade the island and strike at it from all sides.
To get a sense of how the new Trump administration could confront the increasingly perilous issue of the standoff between China and Taiwan, we asked six experts in Beijing-Taipei relations for their thoughts.
Our participating subject matter experts are:
Simona Alba Grano, Senior Lecturer at the University of Zurich and Director of the Taiwan Studies Project there.
Ja Ian Chong, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore and a Non-Resident Scholar, Carnegie China.
Roger Huang, Lecturer Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Australia’s Macquaire University.
Fang-Yu Chen, assistant professor of Political Science at Soochow University, Taiwan, where his research includes US-China-Taiwan relations.
Claire Chu, senior China analyst at Janes in Washington and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.
Kitsch Liao, Assistant Director, Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.
We sent this impressive group the same questions independently so their responses could be as direct and unfiltered as possible. Here they are in full, though some questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity.
Do you see any change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan from the Biden administration to the Trump administration?
Simona Alba Grano:
Unlike U.S. President Joe Biden, Trump is likely to focus more on bilateral relationships than multilateral groupings. He will most probably exit several international organizations and treaties, leaving allies alone, which will be positive for China. Rather than considering Taiwan as a democracy worth protecting in its own right, Taiwan is now a card to be played in Trump’s transactional strategies, which at this point are not yet fully clear.
Ja Ian Chong:
I guess a key thing people will be watching out for is whether and if so, how, the new Trump administration will have Taiwan “pay” more for its defense, or if Trump decides to punish Taiwan for what he calls “stealing” the US semiconductor business despite the fact this has no factual basis. A more hawkish US administration could also lead to more friction around Taiwan, which the Taiwanese may be wary about.
Roger Huang:
It is too early to tell how US-Taiwan relations will change under a Trump administration, although they will inevitably change. There are some telling signs. Trump has already excluded [Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki] Hailey and [Former Trump Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo from any roles in his administration. Both prominent former Trump officials have visited Taiwan relatively recently and are quite popular American political figures in the “Green” camp. [Elon] Musk’s seemingly oversized role/influence in the new Trump administration may lead to some internal contradictions and disagreements within the Trump cabinet. Musk has significant interest in China. He has also previously said that Taiwan should accept a “1 country 2 systems” formula- Hong Kong style, even at the expense of Taiwan’s current freedom and democracy. On the other hand, [U.S. Sen. Marco] Rubio [nominated to be Secretary of State] is a well-known China hawk, who is on the record as very supportive of Taiwan and an advocate for more arms sales to Taiwan.
Fang-Yu Chen:
One of the most important achievements of the Biden administration is the “internationalization of the Taiwan Strait issue,” addressing it through multilateral mechanisms. Also, the Biden administration tries very hard to rally allies to contain China. The Trump administration, on the other hand, might focus more on bilateral approaches and placed relatively less emphasis on multilateral organizations such as the [Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity] IPEF, the US-Japan-Korea alliance, and the Chip 4 Alliance [between the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, with the aim of creating a more secure global semiconductor supply chain]. U.S. support for Taiwan will continue, as will sanctions against China, but there are likely to be some adjustments in the approach.
Claire Chu:
The incoming administration may be more willing to challenge the status quo relationship with China and Taiwan. Beijing has been upping the ante, escalating its use of deliberate pressure tactics to constrain Taiwan’s decision-making space and enforce Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation while building up its own capabilities. Chinese leadership could expect a more offensive posture from Washington that trends away from “measured” and towards “open” competition.
Kitsch Liao:
- Policy bedrock unchanged: Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) [legislation to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote continued extensive, close, and friendly relations between the people of the United States and Taiwanese], Three Communiques [joint communiques issued by the United States and China in 1972, 1979, and 1982 that continue to serve as the foundation for U.S.-China relations] and Six Assurances [guidelines in conducting United States – Taiwan relations].
- This means the U.S. has committed to, in accordance with TRA, maintain the capacity to resist China’s coercion [NOTE: lots of grey area, and Beijing plays in the grey] and invasion of Taiwan, and provide Taiwan with defensive weapons, but not commit to an intervention.
- Variable is on how the Trump administration sees what constitutes “arms of a defensive character” suitable to provide to Taiwan, and how the administration will interpret what is sufficient capacity for the U.S. to maintain in order to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”
- Strategic ambiguity: strategic ambiguity, originally known as “duel deterrence,” is a policy that can be dictated by POTUS. Biden was clear that he will intervene; some think this is helpful but others don’t. Trump’s deal-making nature makes this more ambiguous and will be perceived in the region as such.
What about the flow of arms from the U.S. to Taiwan?
Simona Alba Grano:
Trump’s return to the White House means first and foremost a lot of uncertainties for Taiwan going forward, given that the U.S. remains the island’s most important international security guarantor, legally bound to provide it with defensive weapons. Given some recent comments by Trump, his return could mean that Taiwan will be required to pay more for its defense and if it does not, arms sales will be slowed down.
Ja Ian Chong:
At least in the short term, there could be arms sales. However, whether this situation persists may be more difficult to anticipate. Then apart from sales, there is the question of delivery. The Biden administration was allegedly slow on some deliveries. This situation may ease if the Trump administration no longer prioritizes Ukraine, but then again it may not.
Roger Huang:
It is likely that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will not only continue but increase. Taiwan will likely be pressured by the Trump administration to increase its defense budget. We know that in Trump’s thinking, many U.S. allies are “free riding” U.S. defense/military commitments. We would most likely see the U.S. wanting to see Taiwan increase its defense budget by several percentage points to demonstrate Taiwan’s seriousness in building up its self-defense capability.
Fang-Yu Chen:
The U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will definitely continue. According to the classified memo of the President established during the Reagan administration, which was later declassified by John Bolton, the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are based on the level of threat posed by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Since China’s threat will only grow stronger and the U.S. national interest lies in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. will continue to keep the so-called status quo and stability of the region. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will persist. The key issue should be discussing how much Taiwan can acquire and the strategy of defense and system of the weaponry. So far, the appointments in the new administration have all involved individuals who recognize China as a significant threat to U.S. national security. They are even more likely to support Taiwan’s military defense.
Claire Chu:
There will likely be continuity with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, but it will run parallel to conversations about Taiwan’s self-defense progress.
Kitsch Liao:
There are two parts, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) portion, and the more recent direct transfer under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA).
FMS:
- Established, relatively stable annual process including the annual Monterey Talk [designed to sync interagency discussions and examine all-of-government security issues such as crisis response scenarios, security cooperation, and resilience] to hammer out acquisition priority.
- Taiwan service interest potentially on the rise, as Army, Navy, and Air Force contemplating individual big-ticket items. Some in apparent contradiction to the established, porcupine-style Overall Defense Concept (ODC).
- There are debates ongoing between U.S. and Taiwan about what sort of strategy makes the best sense; however administration shift unlikely to have a big impact; there’s also strong support from Congress for continued arms sales.
- Delays in FMS delivery may still persist, as the issue concerns U.S. bureaucratic capacity to process large and complex acquisitions.
PDA:
- PDAs arguably constitute a more important portion of strengthening Taiwan’s defense in the near term. On top of the direct transfer of military equipment, some of the crucial training and assessments on the ground in Taiwan right now are supported through this authorization. The PDA is crucial in building Taiwan up to pose sufficient conventional deterrence before 2027, when PLA would be a “basically modern” force, and capable but not guaranteed to win an invasion of Taiwan.
- By its very nature, PDA is more sensitive to the administration’s whims and thus there’s greater uncertainty surrounding its continuation.
Is the U.S. more or less likely to come to Taiwan’s assistance in the event of a Chinese invasion under the new administration?
Simona Alba Grano:
On one side, the rising U.S.-China competition continues to increase Taiwan’s strategic importance in the U.S.-dominated “first island chain.” That, coupled with its economic importance as the world supplier of advanced semiconductors makes it unlikely that Trump will sacrifice Taiwan completely, especially considering that Congress in the U.S. has always been and will continue to be predominantly close to Taiwan. On the other hand, as stated above his transactional nature and unpredictability make it very difficult to predict what Trump could do in the long run.
Ja Ian Chong:
I think the jury is out on this one. A lot will depend on how the U.S.-PRC relationship as well as the U.S.-Taiwan relationship pans out. That said, the previous Trump presidency suggests toughness on economic matters but less clear resolve on military issues.
Roger Huang:
Given the increasingly isolationist mood in the U.S., it remains to be seen how Trump would respond to Chinese adventurism.
Fang-Yu Chen:
Verbal statements and commitments might decrease, as Mr. Trump has already stated that he is unwilling to make direct promises, believing that doing so is unfavorable for negotiations. For Trump, everything is transactional. However, the support and commitments from Trump administration officials toward Taiwan are unlikely to diminish.
In Taiwan, the ruling party remains the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), so its policy toward the U.S. will not change. It will continue to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan relations and push forward military reforms. In the short term, Taiwan will continue to demonstrate its determination for self-defense, making it unlikely for the U.S. position to shift.
Claire Chu:
Ongoing armed conflicts in multiple theaters may strain U.S. forces’ Pacific readiness, raising the question of ability. An increasingly war-weary American public may raise the question of will. But the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense has been underpinned by enduring bipartisan interest for decades and is not likely to change under the new administration.
Kitsch Liao:
- Beijing watched and learned from what Russia did wrong during the initial failure in Ukraine. Consequently, China is more likely to gradually escalate, a “frog boiling in water” situation.
- Critical need would be rallying allies and partners together, and that will be harder for the incoming administration. PRC has U.S. action priced in. What they don’t have priced in is what U.S. allies would do—that is what can change Beijing’s calculus mid-stream.
- Should Beijing launch an all-out invasion, overall uncertainty increases for all scenarios concerned, even the ones where the U.S. traditionally would consider not to intervene.
- Because even the Congressionally mandated TRA took pains to ensure any administration would have the liberty to interpret and act on any given Taiwan Strait situation as it sees fit, and the communiques and assurances are policy decisions that can easily be overruled by POTUS.
Is China more or less likely to invade during the Trump administration?
Simona Alba Grano:
At this point it is impossible to predict as it is too early to see what Trump will do, so I have left [the question] unanswered.
Ja Ian Chong:
I do not think the likelihood of an invasion scenario changes. Overall, the chances of invasion are lower than a blockade, which is lower than the continued use of grey zone tactics to wear Taiwan down. Invasion may be risky and expensive for Beijing as well, especially when there seem to be cheaper and less risky options. I can see Beijing stepping up grey zone operations and coercion, however. That may increase the risk of escalation. An invasion may take place if the PRC for some reason believes that it is both cheap and easy.
Roger Huang:
I don’t see a full-on Chinese invasion as a likely scenario in the near future. The bigger worry is the incremental erosion of Taiwanese sovereignty and active control of its territories. PRC’s ramping up of its military exercises near Taiwanese territory, including the PLA’s dismissal of the de facto median line and intrusion in Taiwan’s restricted/prohibited waters near Kinmen and Matsu will have longer-term implications (and therefore higher chance of a more militarily aggressive China).
Fang-Yu Chen:
In the short term, China will certainly use various methods to test the Trump administration’s limits while taking advantage of the transition period for personnel appointments to prepare for potential future trade wars. During this time, gray zone warfare is likely to increase, but the likelihood of a direct military invasion remains low.
China’s current economic situation is dire, leaving it without sufficient resources for large-scale military operations, and such actions would pose excessively high risks for its leadership.
Claire Chu:
From my perspective, China is not in a hurry to attempt a forceful takeover of Taiwan – at least, not until a quick decisive victory is guaranteed. Instead, China is likely to continue testing the waters, quite literally, while ramping up its gray zone aggression toward Taiwan – for which the U.S. has never articulated a red line – before assessing its options based on the Trump administration’s reaction.
But also, China has and will continue to employ a multitude of coercive, non-kinetic measures against Taiwan that are intended to chip away at its international legitimacy, cyber resilience, information environment, national identity, and credible will for self-defense – all without firing a shot. That’s what I’m more concerned about.
Kitsch Liao:
- This one is impossible to call. This is going to be a Xi Jinping call, and the question is what impacts Xi’s calculus and in what direction, and this may very well depend on Xi himself and his personal interaction with Trump, much of which we won’t see.
- There are two big scenarios:
- Opportunistic: China may see an opening should Xi believe Taiwan’s conventional deterrence is lacking, or influence operation has matured on the ground, and launch an invasion to take advantage. The less predictable nature of the Trump administration’s reaction to a Chinese aggressive action toward Taiwan creates more risks in the mind of a Chinese planner, which increases the barrier for any opportunistic move against Taiwan.
- Forced hand: Xi sees game-changing moves from Taiwan or the U.S. that threaten the CCP’s ruling legitimacy in ways that demand a response. In other words, China will invade Taiwan when Xi lost the ability to credibly claim that Taiwan will “eventually” be unified with China, therefore any gesture and messaging from the oncoming administration, whether intentional or not, that would lead to Xi or the politburo to such conclusion would increase that likelihood.
A big thank you to all our experts for taking the time to answer our questions on this incredibly challenging but extremely important topic.
Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com