Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claims it has found dozens of Western-made components in the Russian S-70 Okhotnik-B (Hunter-B) flying wing unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) downed last month in a case of friendly fire.
“The aggressor state, despite sanctions, used components manufactured by Western companies to create this weapon,” GUR said on Telegram Friday. “In particular, microelectronics and other technological components manufactured by the companies Analog Devices, Texas Instruments and Xilinx-AMD (USA), Infineon Technologies (Germany), STMicroelectronics (Switzerland) were found in the Russian S-70 Hunter.” GUR found components from several other companies as well.
The S-70 is a heavy-weight strike and reconnaissance tactical drone with some low observable (stealthy) features. It can also partake in air-to-air as well as air-to-ground combat and reconnaissance duties. Independent operations and those paired with other aircraft, both manned and unmanned, are envisioned for its type. GUR said the drone that went down in Ukraine was the fourth S-70 prototype.
The directorate, which maintains a database of thousands of foreign components found in Russian weapons, published a list of 30 found in the S-70. Among them was a motor driver with a built-in current sensor made by Maxim Integrated Products, a transistor made by Infineon Technologies, a microprocessor made by Xilinx Inc, a power module made by Texas Instruments, an isolator made by Analog Devices and a microprocessor made by STMicroelectronics. Dozens of other components from these and several other companies were found as well.
Russian weapons “depend on foreign components,” GUR stated on its database. “Without them, they cannot continue to fight, occupy and kill.”
All told, GUR said it has found more than 4,000 foriegn components in nearly 150 captured or recovered Russian weapons. The discovery of those in the S-70 marks the latest example of how Russia is evading sanctions placed on it after launching its all-out war on Ukraine.
The origin of the components on the S-70 is unclear and GUR provided no further information about how they were obtained by Russia. These would not necessarily have to be sourced directly from the manufacturers, however. Also, there is a massive and largely unregulated market for recycled chips, largely emanating from China. In addition, many components are found in appliances and other non-military items. While those are harder to prevent from falling into the wrong hands, U.S. officials have the authority to prevent shipments of those dual-use chips if they consider the application to have critical military uses.
To help stem the flow of military technology to Russia, U.S. government agencies have issued sanctions against hundreds of companies around the world that provide Russia with technology.
Last month, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned 275 individuals and entities “involved in supplying Russia with advanced technology and equipment that it desperately needs to support its war machine,” the department said in a media release. The “action targets both individual actors and sprawling sanctions evasion networks across 17 jurisdictions, including India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Switzerland, Thailand, and Türkiye. In addition to disrupting global evasion networks, this action also targets domestic Russian importers and producers of key inputs and other materiel for Russia’s military-industrial base.”
There is no indication, however, that any of the chips in the S-70 violated any provisions. Moreover, the UCAV had been in development for years before sanctions were imposed on Russia.
As we previously noted, the S-70 downed over Ukrainian territory appears to be one of the earlier examples, which first emerged in early 2019, or one built to a similar specification with significantly lower sophistication than a more refined variant with enhanced low-observable (stealth) features rolled out in 2021.
After the S-70 was discovered, we pointed out that its wreckage “may represent the most enticing foreign material exploitation (FME) opportunity of the conflict, and there have been many of them so far.”
While not a find of any new technology, today’s announcement by GUR about the components highlights the importance of such efforts.
We reached out to the companies highlighted by GUR for their responses.
“ST is an integrated device manufacturer,” company spokesman Ronan Mulvaney told us in an email Friday. “We work with more than 200,000 customers and thousands of partners around the world. We do not authorize nor condone the use of our products outside of their intended purpose.”
The company, Mulvaney added, has a “comprehensive global trade compliance program through which we comply with all international trade rules and regulations. We have an internal export control compliance program that contains training and procedures to assure compliance with various export controls regulations. As part of that program, we provide guidelines to our sales channels to assure each party in our supply chain understands its responsibility to comply with applicable laws and regulations. We also collaborate and exchange information with third parties undertaking field research efforts as well as various government and non-government organizations.”
Since the start of Russia’s all-out war, ST has “taken actions to comply with the specific requirements of multiple sanction packages and export control measures implemented by the European Union, United States, and partnering countries against Russia and Belarus,” Mulvaney explained. “These actions include reinforcing the compliance requirements for all our sales channels – including vigilance against sanction evasion and shipping diversion, implementing additional end user screening measures, deploying automated solutions for customers and product checks, and enhancing our awareness communication to targeted stakeholders.”
Furthermore, ST no longer has operations in Russia, Mulvaney stated.
Infineon has also taken steps to stop the flow of its components to Russia, the company says.
“Compliance with applicable laws is of paramount importance for Infineon, and we have established robust policies and processes to comply with these laws,” company spokesman Andre Tauber told The War Zone in an email.
A huge challenge, he said, is controlling sales “throughout the entire lifetime of a product (Infineon produces around 30 billion chips per year). Still, we have taken extensive measures at our disposal to ensure compliance with sanctions aiming to not only comply with the letter but also with the spirit of the sanctions.”
Infineon, Tauber added, “has taken extensive measures to stop all direct and indirect shipments to Russia immediately after the Russian attack on Ukraine regardless of the legal possibility to continue certain transactions. As decided in March 2022, Infineon subsequently liquidated its entity in Russia.”
The company has “instructed all distribution partners globally to implement robust measures that will prevent any diversion of Infineon products or services contrary to the sanctions. Infineon has reiterated and specified this clear position several times in communications to its distribution partners.”
In addition, Infineon uses “various data sources to oversee compliance with existing regulations. In case we get tangible evidence that companies with which we have a business relationship are doing trade with Russia, we terminate the delivery and demand clarification from the company in question.”
This is not by any means the first time components from some of these companies have been found on Russian weapons. Far from it, in fact. A number were discovered in weapons listed on the database GUR provided to us in 2022.
Back then, Infineon told us it had “not found any evidence of military use of our products in Russia.”
While other companies mentioned have yet to return messages today, Analog Devices responded in 2022.
The company that eventually bought Maxim Integrated told us at the time, it was “committed to full compliance with U.S, EU and other countries’ laws including export controls, trade sanctions and regulations,” said Ferda Millan, a company spokeswoman.
Iranian and North Korean weapons used by Russia and recovered by Ukraine also contain large amounts of Western components.
For example, in 2022 we reported that a number of electronic components powering the Iranian-made Mohajer-6 drones used by Russian forces in Ukraine were produced in the United States and other allied nations.
Perhaps even more alarming, a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) produced by North Korea used against Ukraine by Russia earlier this year relied on more than 290 foreign-sourced components, many of them originating from U.S. manufacturers, according to a study by Conflict Armament Research (CAR), a U.K.-based investigative organization.
The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) acknowledges the challenge.
“The sheer global ubiquity of semiconductors underscores the challenge we face. According to World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, the semiconductor industry shipped over 3 trillion chips globally between 2021 and 2023,” SIA said in a recent blog. “These volumes will only increase as global demand for semiconductors continues to boom, with global sales projected to reach $1 trillion by 2030. Trillions more chips – many of which were sold and shipped years before Russia invaded Ukraine – remain in circulation, often stockpiled in warehouses. Mature node, or so-called ‘legacy’ chips, have a shelf life that can last decades. So, it is unsurprising some chips recovered from Russian weapons in Ukraine were manufactured well before the beginning of the conflict, and in some cases by companies that no longer exist.”
Russia “also has decades of experience evading export controls and sanctions, building a system of transshipment routes, cultivating networks of diverters in third countries, and employing sophisticated deception tactics,” SIA noted. “Malign actors go to great lengths to circumvent government restrictions and established company compliance actions, evading even the most sophisticated screening and due diligence efforts.”
While it is exceedingly difficult for governments and companies to police the flow of these vital components, GUR offered a list of suggestions on how to improve the fight to stop it.
Governments should “approve the list of goods subject to enhanced export control ban their re-export to Russia, Belarus, Iran, and the DPRK and “standardize enhanced inspection procedures during their deliveries to risky jurisdictions increase liability for violations and negligence.”
In addition, banks should be “involved in inspections and share information and synchronize efforts with other countries.”
Meanwhile, manufacturers and distributors should “form a list of products whose deliveries require enhanced inspections approve and regularly update inspection procedures taking into account recommendations, red-flags, sanctions circumvention schemes disseminate new inspection policies among counterparties.”
They should also add a condition of compliance to their contracts, respond to detection of products in Russian weapons, investigate the supply chain, and get involved parties and governments to take measures to stop supplies, GUR argued.
The companies who responded to our queries said they were taking such steps. However, given the vast number of components, companies, countries and profits involved, coordination and cooperation may be impossible to achieve on a grand scale. The fact that chips of all types get dumped into China’s vast recycling ecosystem also makes preventing them falling into unwanted hands all but impossible. As a result, the S-70 Hunter-B won’t be the last Russian weapon found to be packed Western-made components.
Update: 4:15 PM Eastern –
Analog Devices Inc. and Texas Instruments responded to our questions.
Analog Devices Inc. (ADI) “is committed to preventing the unauthorized resale, illicit diversion, and misuse of our products, and to complying with applicable laws and regulations in the countries where we operate,” company official Ferda Millan told us. “We at ADI strongly condemn the illicit diversion and unintended misuse of our products.”
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and in compliance with U.S. and EU sanctions, “ADI ceased business activities in Russia and the Russian-backed regions of Ukraine and Belarus, and promptly instructed all of our distributors to halt shipments of our products into these regions,” Millan added. “Combating the unauthorized resale, diversion, and misuse of products and technologies is a challenge the entire semiconductor industry faces and one that ADI takes very seriously.”
In addition “ADI is dedicated to upholding high standards of compliance and transparency,” Millan explained. “We continue to look for ways to identify and prevent third-party attempts to engage in unauthorized resale, diversion, or misuse of our products and technology.”
The company “firmly believes that preventing illicit diversion requires a unified effort and vigilant approach,” Millan continued. ”ADI supports and is cooperating with efforts by the U.S. Congress, federal government agencies, law enforcement, and non-governmental organizations to investigate improper diversion of semiconductor parts and take appropriate action to stop it. ”
Texas Instruments (TI) “strongly opposes the use of our chips in Russian military equipment and the illicit diversion of our products to Russia,” the company told The War Zone. “TI stopped selling products into Russia and Belarus in February 2022. Any shipments of TI chips into Russia are illicit and unauthorized.”
The company devotes “significant time and resources to developing, implementing and refining policies and procedures to combat illicit diversion and keep chips out of the hands of bad actors,” TI added. “Our dedicated global trade compliance team carefully monitors the sale and shipment of our products, including screening customers and orders multiple times throughout the ordering process. We regularly identify and block suspicious and fraudulent orders.”
TI said it is company policy to “comply with export control laws. We require our distributors and customers to comply with export control laws and prohibit them from reselling chips into Russia. If there is evidence indicating diversion, we investigate and take action.
“We are committed to continually evolving and improving our efforts working collaboratively with law enforcement, government agencies, non-governmental organizations and industry partners.”
Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com