Russian President Vladimir Putin has raised the possibility of forward deploying new Oreshnik ballistic missiles capable of carrying multiple warheads in neighboring Belarus by latter half of next year. Oreshnik, which U.S. officials have said is an intermediate-range design derived from the RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), first emerged after it was used in an unprecedented attack on Ukraine last month.
Putin discussed the feasibility of placing Oreshniks in Belarus during a televised ceremony today in Minsk, where he signed a new mutual defense agreement with that country’s leader Alexander Lukashenko. With the deal now in place, Belarus, the affairs of which have been ever more deeply intertwined with those of Russia in recent years, is firmly and openly under the protection of the latter’s nuclear deterrent umbrella. Russia had already begun deploying nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory in cooperation with that country’s armed forces last year.
“Russia recently successfully launched the Oreshnik. This had a certain impact on our former partners, and now rivals. Do not consider this some kind of impudence, but I would like to publicly ask you to deploy new weapons systems, primarily the Oreshnik, on the territory of Belarus,” Lukashenko said at one point in the ceremony, per a machine translation of his remarks as reported by Russia’s Interfax. “I would very much ask you to think about it and agree to our request.”
“I think this will become possible in the second half of next year, as serial production of these systems in Russia increases and as these missile systems enter service with the Russian strategic forces,” Putin said in response, according to Reuters.
“There are a number of technical issues that must be resolved by specialists, namely, determining the minimum range taking into account the priorities of ensuring the security of the Republic of Belarus,” Putin added, per another machine translation of a report from the Kommersant newspaper in Russia. He also indicated that if Oreshniks were sent to Belarus that they would be under the control of Russian forces, but that Belarusian authorities would have a say in what targets they could be employed against.
Details about Oreshnik remain limited. After its use against Ukraine in November, Putin had described it as a “medium-range missile system” and “a ballistic missile equipped with non-nuclear hypersonic technology” capable of reaching a peak speed of Mach 10. “The kinetic impact is powerful, like a meteorite falling,” the Russian president more recently said.
At the time of the attack, Ukrainian authorities separately said that the missile that was fired at them carried six warheads each containing six more sub-payloads. Officials in Ukraine also later said that the warheads contained no explosives, according to Reuters. Whether these were traditional re-entry vehicles, maneuvering ones, or true hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, and what kinds of warheads (conventional or nuclear) they may be able to carry, remain unknown. Larger ballistic missiles, even ones with traditional designs, reach hypersonic speeds, typically defined as anything above Mach 5, in the terminal stage of their flight.
U.S. authorities also subsequently said that Oreshnik is an intermediate-range weapon based on the RS-26, the development of which was said to have been shelved in 2018. Officially categorized as an ICBM, there have long been discussions about whether the Rubezh was actually an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) design. IRBMs and ICBMs are defined as having maximum ranges between 1,864 and 3,418 miles (3,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and greater than 3,418 miles (5,500 kilometers), respectively. You can read more about the RS-26 in detail here.
Putin’s comments today that Oreshnik is not yet in serial production underscores that the missile remains developmental in nature and that there are only likely a very limited number available currently.
The Russian president’s note that Oreshnik’s minimum range apparently still needs to be definitively determined is also notable. The example that struck Ukraine in November hit a target roughly 500 miles from the launch site in Kapustin Yar. As such, forward-deploying the missiles to Belarus might actually limit the ability to employ them against certain targets, such as those in Ukraine. The straight-shot distance between the far-northern end of Belarus and the Ukrainian border is only around 350 miles at most. Ukraine’s capital Kyiv lies just some 56 miles from the boundary with Belarus.
There has also been much discussion already about the threat Oreshnik poses to targets elsewhere in Europe, including the capitals of all NATO members in the region. This is something that Russian media has been happy to highlight, as seen below. From launch sites in Belarus, Oreshnik’s minimum range could be factor in this context, as well. Belarus directly borders NATO allies Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania, and is also in relatively close proximity to another member of the alliance, Estonia.
Oreshniks could be fired across very high lofted trajectories to hit targets at shorter ranges, but there would still be a limit to what could be achieved in this way. Doing this could also increase the speed at which the missile and/or any payloads it releases are moving in the terminal phase, and the potentially destructive stresses on them, as well.
Regardless, having Oreshniks in Belarus could also still be useful for dispersing that capability and shorter-range munitions deployed in that country, including nuclear-capable Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles, which could still be employed against targets in closer proximity. The missile by itself presents a longer-range strategic-level threat that can be employed without crossing the nuclear threshold, something Russia has visibly demonstrated through the real-world attack on Ukraine. Whether it is also nuclear-capable is unclear. At a peak speed of at least Mach 10 (Ukrainian officials have said the missile fired at them might have actually gotten up to Mach 11), the weapon would also be flying faster than most air and missile defense systems can reliably intercept.
The War Zone was quick to highlight the broader signaling to Russia’s regional and global opponents behind the very public use of Oreshnik in November. Russian authorities used existing nuclear risk reduction channels to alert the United States to the launch of the missile beforehand. The New York Times reported this week that Russian Army General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov also told U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Q. Brown in a subsequent phone call that the launch had been in the works for some time. Gerasimov reportedly said the planning predated the U.S. government’s decision to allow Ukrainian forces to fire Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles at targets inside Russia. This was also the first-ever direct call between Gerasimov and Brown, and Brown is said to have agreed to not proactively announce that it had occurred.
All of this follows very public announcements by the U.S. military about its intention to send intermediate-range strike capabilities to Germany, and potentially elsewhere in Europe, in the coming years. This includes planned “episodic deployments” of the U.S. Army’s Typhon ground-based missile system, which can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles and multi-purpose SM-6 missiles, as well as that service’s still-in-development Dark Eagle hypersonic missile. The U.S. Navy has also demonstrated its ability to deploy containerized launchers related to Typhon, which can be employed in a ground-base mode and also fire Tomahawks and SM-6s, to sites in Europe.
Exactly when Oreshniks might appear in Belarus and how many missiles might be deployed there remain to be seen. At the same time, the missile is already clearly emerging as a particularly important element of any discussion about the evolving geopolitical environment in Europe and potentially beyond.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com