It is now confirmed that the weapon Russia fired in an unprecedented attack on Ukraine yesterday was not an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). However, the missile in question, named Oreshnik, is technically derived from an ICBM. Its use highlights past discussions about the potential value of a conventionally armed ICBM, which some countries may be looking at fielding if they haven’t already, and that would offer a unique extremely long-range strike capability below the nuclear threshold.
Russian President Vladimir Putin disclosed the existence of Oreshnik and announced its use in the attack on the eastern Ukrainian city of Dnipro in a televised address yesterday. The missile is based on the RS-26 Rubezh, according to the Pentagon, a secretive missile you can read more about in detail here. Readers can also find more about what is known about the attack and Oreshnik in The War Zone‘s prior reporting.
When it comes to ballistic missiles, intercontinental range is defined as anything greater than 3,418 miles (5,500 kilometers). Short, Medium, and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM) have ranges of 620 miles (1,000 kilometers) or less, between 620 and 1,860 miles (1,000 and 3,000 kilometers), and between 1,864 and 3,418 miles (3,000 to 5,500 kilometers), respectively.
Within those categories, the exact configuration of the missile, including how many warheads it carries, conventional or nuclear, can vary significantly.
The Oreshnik that Russia fired at Ukraine yesterday carried six individual warheads each with six submunitions, according to authorities in the latter country. Putin has said the weapon included unspecified “non-nuclear hypersonic technology.” It remains unknown when the missile carried standard re-entry vehicles, maneuvering ones, or true hypersonic boost-glide vehicles. ICBMs and other larger ballistic missiles, and their payloads, typically reach substantial hypersonic speeds, generally defined as Mach 5 or above, in the course of their flight and especially while their payloads careen down to their targets.
It’s worth noting here that the RS-26 already represents an unusual case when it comes to categorization. Officially, Rubezh is an ICBM, but there has long been evidence that it is actually an IRBM. The RS-26 is itself understood to be a shortened derivative of the RS-24 Yars ICBM, which the U.S. government assesses to just be a variant of the preceding RS-12M Topol-M. There is already some debate also about where the Oreshnik lies on the range spectrum, with Putin calling it a medium-range weapon and American officials putting it in the IRBM category.
This all may have contributed in various ways to Ukraine’s initial assessment that what Russian forces had fired was an ICBM.
That being said, the concept at least of a conventionally armed ICBM is a real thing. Just last year, the U.S. military openly stated that it had assessed there to be “possible interest in [the] development of a conventional ICBM” within China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
There have also been reports that Israel’s Jericho 3, described as an ICBM, can be employed with a conventional payload. The earlier Jericho 1 short-range ballistic missile and Jericho 2 IRBM, both of which were reportedly retired in the 1990s, are also understood to have been able to carry conventional warheads, as well as nuclear ones. Israel does not publicly acknowledge the existence of its nuclear or longer-range ballistic missile arsenals.
“Israel is also reportedly developing the next generation of the Jericho, the Jericho 4, a three-stage missile, whose capabilities will include the possibility of carrying fragmentation warheads,” according to a report earlier this year from The Jerusalem Post. The story did not provide any further details about that missile, including a range categorization, but it points to the possibility of another Israeli long-range conventional ballistic missile capability in the works.
The U.S. military has also explored similar capabilities in the past, including a possible conventionally-armed version of the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile, which has intercontinental range.
After the Pentagon highlighted Chinese interest in a conventional ICBM in 2023, The War Zone explored the potential benefits of such a capability, writing:
“A likely goal of developing such a system for the PLA would be to have a weapon that puts strategic targets, such as air bases, ports, major command and control nodes, and seats of government, as well as symbolic ones, anywhere in the United States (or really anywhere in the world) at risk without having to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. This could offer a powerful deterrent to non-nuclear strikes against the Chinese mainland.”
“In addition, the hope could be that if these conventional ICBMs ever had to be used the U.S. government, or any other potential nuclear-armed adversary, would be significantly less likely to retaliate with nuclear weapons.”
In a separate story exploring the possibility of Israel using Jerichos with conventional warheads against Iran, The War Zone further highlighted what a weapon of this kind might offer:
“Already, the Jericho missiles provide the fastest means of striking targets in Iran, and their ballistic trajectory and speed would likely render them immune to interception, especially given the very limited capabilities of Iran’s air defenses against ballistic missile threats. A subsonic cruise missile would be much easier to intercept and wouldn’t provide the option of hitting certain time-sensitive or hardened targets. And in contrast to long-range direct attacks by Israeli Air Force aircraft, no Israeli personnel would be put in harm’s way. “
“A Jericho missile with a conventional payload would be a very capable weapon in its own right, for the above reasons and even a high-explosive warhead would be extremely destructive. According to CSIS, the Jericho 2 can carry a 3,300-pound high-explosive warhead, while the Jericho 3 has a payload capacity of between 2,200 and 2,900 pounds, although that is in a configuration that has to fly many thousands of miles, not one that has to hit a fraction of that distance. So a much larger payload could be possible if it was adapted for a regional strike profile.”
“The extreme speed that the missiles’ warheads would be traveling during their terminal attack makes them capable of targeting hardened or buried command centers and other key fortified sites to a degree the IAF isn’t capable of. This is a huge capability to consider. Israel does not have the ability to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities that are deeply buried, like the enrichment site in Fordow, via traditional aerial attack, without resorting to nuclear strikes. The United States is the only nation with a conventional air-to-ground capability that could potentially do this — the U.S. B-2 stealth bomber and its Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). But, knowing this limitation, could Israel have created conventional penetrator warheads for its ballistic missiles that could potentially threaten these sites, at least being capable of disabling them for a period of time?”
A conventional ICBM carrying multiple warheads, or even with a true multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) configuration, could offer even greater capability. A MIRVed missile with conventionally-armed re-entry vehicles with significant accuracy would allow a single missile to strike multiple impact points.
There are also clear strategic messaging benefits that would come along with a conventional ICBM capability. A successful attack with such a weapon would have the knock-on effect of very visibly demonstrating the ability to conduct a nuclear strike.
Russia clearly had a desire to send signals to Ukraine, and more so to the United States and other countries supporting it, as well as demonstrate a practical capability, with its use of Oreshnik today.
At the same time, while there are clear benefits to fielding a conventionally armed ICBM, they could also present worrying discrimination challenges for a defender, who would struggle to determine whether or not they were under nuclear threat. The speed at which an ICBM travels already limits the time available to assess the threat and respond in any way. All of this raises the possibility of a scenario in which an opponent, mistakenly believes they are under nuclear attack and responds in kind, which in turn could well prompt a rapidly escalating nuclear exchange.
This is not an idle concern. The Pentagon has said it received advance warning of the Oreshnik attack directly from the Russians through established nuclear risk reduction channels. The notification occurred even though Russia’s forces fired the missile across a relatively short distance (roughly 500 miles) at a target inside a non-nuclear state not covered by America’s deterrent umbrella.
The same kinds of discrimination fears played a significant role in the U.S. military’s previous decision to scrap work on the Conventional Trident Missile. American officials have also openly criticized China’s ambiguity around their deployment of longer-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads.
While it has turned out that the RS-26-based Oreshnik that Russia fired at Ukraine was not a conventionally-armed ICBM, it still highlights the very real interest in, if not more active development and even potential fielding of, a weapon of that kind globally.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com